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European Community Competition Law
and National Competition Laws:
Compatibility Problems from a German
Perspective
Joachim Zekoll*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines conflicts between the European Community (EC
or Community) competition rules and the correspondinglaws of the Federal Republic of Germany in three case categories. Professor Zekoll first
discusses situations in which corporate practices or agreements violate
EC law, but are considered legal under German law. He then analyzes
frictions that may arise when both EC and German laws are violated. In
both of these case categories, Community law prevails over conflicting solutions under German law. However, considerabledoubt exists about the
primacy of Community law with respect to the third category involving
practices that violate German law, but are allowed under the Community
competition rules. According to the traditional "two-barrier theory" espoused by most German courts, corporate activity must be lawful under
both national and EC law in order to be allowed. Since both legal regimes are regarded as regulating different spheres of economic activity,
no conflict between the systems can occur. As a result, under this approach, prohibitive German law always should take priority over permissive Community rules.
The author takes the view that tensions may arise between prohibitive
national competition rules and permissive Community law, and that, as
a rule, the latter should prevail. He differentiates, however, between the
devices on which the EC Commission relies in its decision to permit a
practice or agreement. The so-called "comfort letters" and "negative
clearances" declaring an agreement not to be in violation of EC rules
cannot create a conflict with national law, and thus do not preclude the
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Clay Beery for his able research assistance.
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application of nationalprohibitions.However, individual and group exemptions issued by the Commission to allow certain agreements merit a
different treatment. These exemptions reflect policy concerns of the Community that may be thwarted if contrary national law is applied. While
German courts are reluctant to attribute any independent importance to
Community exemptions, the Commission, followed by a strong majority
within the academic discussion, endorses the principle of the primacy of
these permissive EC rules. Professor Zekoll concludes that this principle
does not mandate a blanket rejection of prohibitive national rules. Instead, a case-by-case evaluation of the true scope of Community exemptions and the underlying interests reveals that the application of national restrictions to a particularpracticefrequently will not frustrate
the Community's objectives.
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INTRODUCTION

The Nature of the Problem

On January 1, 1958, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (Treaty of Rome or Treaty) took effect in the six original
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member states.' The Treaty established competition rules intended to
govern business behavior throughout the European Community (EC or
Community).' Coincidentally, on the same day, the first German Act
Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) entered into force. While similar principles govern both the German and the EC antitrust regimes,
they differ in many fundamental respects. Subsequent amendments to
the GWB have not led to any significant degree of adaptation to the
Community rules, thus perpetuating the potential for conflict in situations in which both legal regimes apply.3
Although the Council of the European Community has the responsibility to define the relationship between national laws and Community
rules,4 it has not yet acted. There are also no current plans for a Council
directive aimed at harmonizing the competition rules of member states
themselves.5 The Single European Act, which provides for the creation

1. The six original member states were Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of
Rome].
2. These competition rules are set forth in articles 85 through 94 of the Treaty. Id.
at 47-52.
3. The GWB has been amended five times since its inception, but these changes have
not led to any substantial reconciliation with the EC rules. The most recent amendment
contains only modest adjustments, such as minor limitations on the availability of exemptions for anticompetitive practices by loan associations and the insurance industry, as
well as for agreements between public utilities. Community law, however, remains significantly stricter in these areas. For a discussion of the amendments to the GWB, see
Pfeffer, The Fifth Amendment of the German Act Against Restraintsof-Competition, 11
EuR. COMPETITION L. REV. 95 (1990).
4. Articles 87(1) and 87(2)(e) of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, provide as
follows:
1. Within a period of three years after the date of the entry into force of this
Treaty, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall lay down any appropriate regulations or directives with a view to the application of the principles set
out in Articles 85 and 86 [the antitrust provisions]. ...
2. The provisions ieferred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed, in particular:
... .(e) to define the relation between, on the one hand, municipal law and, on
the other hand, the provisions contained in this Section or adopted in application
of this Article.
5. The Commission has taken the position that member states' unilateral efforts to
harmonize their laws has reduced the need for such Community-wide action. See, e.g.,
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEvENTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-

POLICY pt. 1, § 1, para. 8 (1988) (noting a "growing coherence between Community rules and national competition laws"). While this observation may be accurate with
respect to some member states, such as France, which has enacted competition rules by
TION
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of an internal European market, does not mandate such a directive, because EC competition law does not fall within those areas that "have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market."'
The recently adopted Merger Control Regulation (Regulation), which
vests the EC Commission with the exclusive authority to regulate mergers, will ease some of the tensions within this sector of competition law.7
The Regulation, however, only pertains to mergers of Community-wide
dimension.8
Although actual friction between the systems has been rare in the
past,9 the potential for such friction is likely to increase with the constant

relying heavily on Community law, it is overly optimistic with regard to others. For a
discussion of the newly enacted French competition law, see Roudard, The New French
Legislation on Competition, 10 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 205 (1989).
6. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L169) art. 18, at 8 (1987). By
amending the provisions of the Treaty, the Act provides for the creation of the internal
market by December 31, 1992, which "shall comprise an area without internal frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this [EEC] Treaty." Id. art. 13. None of the provisions in
Title II of the Act amending the Treaty requires harmonization of national competition
rules. Id. arts. 6-29.
7. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064189 of December 21, 1989 on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L395) 1 (1989),
corrected in 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L73) 34 (1990) [hereinafter Regulation].
8. Moreover, even when the threshold requirements for applying the Merger Control
Regulation are met, national competition rules may still prevail. Article 21(3) of the
Regulation enables member states to prohibit mergers that have been cleared by the
Commission if the prohibition serves "to protect legitimate interests other than those
taken into consideration by this Regulation." Id. These interests include the broad areas
of public security, protecting plurality in the media, and prudential rules for the financial
service industries. For details on the new regulation, see Elland, The Mergers Control
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064189, 11 EU. COMPETITION L. REV. 111 (1990).
9. This has been due in part to the continuous cooperation between the Commission
and the national antitrust authorities. For details, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 7, para. 47
(1975) [hereinafter FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION]; COMMISSION OF THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITIES, SixTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, paras.
114-16 (1977) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION]. Article 10(2) of Regulation 17 of the Council of 6 February 1962 Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962) [hereinafter Regulation No. 17] provides:
The Commission shall carry out the procedure set out in paragraph 1 [i.e., transmit relevant documents pertaining to antitrust infringements and compliance procedures to the national antitrust authorities] in close and constant liaison with the
competent authorities of the Member States; such authorities shall have the right
to express their views upon that procedure.
Regulation 17 is the principle regulation governing the application and enforcement of
the EC competition law. It provides, among other things, a comprehensive procedural
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process of expansion of EC competition law. This Article evaluates the
status and effect of EC competition law in relation to national law
within the Community in three areas of potential conflict: first, situations
in which a practice or agreement violates EC competition law, but is
considered legal under German law; second, when a practice or agreement violates both German and Community law;, third, when a practice
or agreement violates German law, but is permitted under EC competition law.
With respect to the first two categories, tensions between national
rules and Community law are resolved in accordance with the general
principle that Community law prevails. 10 Considerable uncertainty exists, however, about the extent to which this priority must be observed in
the third category in which an agreement violates German antitrust law,
but does not give rise to a claim under EC law.
Early scholarly approaches suggested that this potential conflict could
be resolved by employing the "two-barrier theory." This theory starts
with the assumption that both the Community and its constituent member states each have legitimate, but differing, interests in regulating business behavior-national law is concerned with the effects of corporate
behavior on the internal market, while the Community rules are intended to protect trade between the member states-and that these interests can be protected only if both legal systems are recognized as fully
applicable to a particular corporate transaction. The result of such an
assumption is the rule that corporate behavior must clear the "barrier"
of both national and EC law before it is to be permitted by the Community. Under the two-barrier theory, therefore, prohibitive national law
always is entitled to absolute priority over permissive Community law.
Although discarded by many commentators, most German courts continue to espouse this approach.
As the discussion below will show, allowing national authorites to
prohibit transactions that the EC Commission already has considered
and approved may frustrate the economic integration that the Treaty of
Rome was intended to promote. This does not mean, however, that the
primacy of Community law prevents the application of prohibitive rules
under national law in all circumstances. Instead, a more complex analysis, based upon a case-by-case evaluation of the effect that application of

framework for the actions to be taken by the Commission in application of the competition rules.

10. Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commission [4] C.M.L.R. Antitrust Supp. 264
(1988); Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 100 (1969).

80

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 24:75

national law may have on the goals underlying a Community decision to
permit corporate practices, will reveal that national antitrust enforcement remains important in this case catgegory. Because a discussion of
these questions presupposes some knowlege of the basic EC rules, the
remainder of this introduction will present an outline of EC competition
law and the principles governing its enforcement by the Community
institutions.
B.

The Basics of EC Competition Law

The fundamental EC competition rules are set forth in articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome. Similar to section 1 of the Sherman Act,
article 85(1) prohibits all agreements that may affect trade between
member states and that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Common Market." Article 86 proscribes the abuse of a dominant market position" and, like
11. Article 85(1) provides:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and
shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by
associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect
trade between the Member States and which have as their object or result the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market,
and in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of
additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
12. Article 86 reads:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby,
action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed
to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or
of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or

1991]

COMPETITION LAW FROM A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE

section 2 of the Sherman Act, has been applied to a broad range of unilateral practices, including predatory pricing1" and refusals to supply. 4
The list of activities in article 86 that constitute abuses of a dominant
market position is illustrative rather than exhaustive. For example, the
scope of the article has been expanded to encompass mergers and
5
acquisitions.1
As the texts of articles 85(1) and 86 indicate, only agreements or abusive practices that are capable of affecting trade between the member
states are prohibited." The EC Commission interprets the general prohibition of article 85(1) to apply to a broad range of restrictive agreements, ordinarily without engaging in a "rule of reason" analysis like
that developed by United States courts under section 1 of the Sherman

(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of
additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contract.
Id.
13.

Commission Decision of 14 December 1985 Relating to a Proceeding Under
EUR. COMM. (No. L374) 1

Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV130.698-ECSIAKZO), 28

(1985).
14. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission of the Eur. Communities,
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223 (1974), 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974).
15. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1973 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 215 (1973), 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973); but see British Am. Tobacco
Co. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487, 4575-84
(1987) (The European Court of Justice also acknowledged the applicability of article 85
to mergers and acquisitions.). While the recently adopted Merger Control Regulation,
see Regulation, supra note 7, establishes the principle that Community-wide mergers
should be gauged by the Regulation alone, some commentators have suggested that articles 85 and 86 nevertheless may continue to apply to mergers. For details, see Fine, EC
Merger Control: An Analysis of the New Regulation, 11 Eui. COMPETITION L. REv.
47, 50-51 (1990).
16. For article 85(1), see Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission of Eur.
Communities, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, 151, 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 334, 353
(1978). The criterion is met for purposes of article 86 even when the abusive practice
cannot have a direct effect on interstate trade within the Community. The sole requirement is that the abusive behavior impair the competitive structure within the common
market. See United Brands Co. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 207, 294, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429, 497 (1978), in which the European
Court of Justice held:
[I]f the occupier of a dominant position, established in the Common Market, aims
at eliminating a competitor who is also established in the Common Market, it is
immaterial whether this behavour [sic] relates to trade between Member States
once it has been shown that such elimination will have repercussions on the patterns of competition in the Common Market.

82

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[-Vol 24:75

Act. 17 Only those agreements displaying minimal anticompetitive effects

on the market fall outside the scope of the prohibition.
For practical reasons, -the Commission issued in 1970 a Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Fall Under Article
85(1) (Notice), providing informal guidance as to the market power an
agreement may create without violating article 85(1)."8 According to the
Commission's most recent Notice, agreements generally do not fall under
the prohibition of article 85(1) if the market share of the products or
services covered by the agreement, along with those other goods or- services of the participants considered equivalent, does not amount to more
than five percent of the total market affected by the agreement, and if the
aggregate turnover of the participating firms does not exceed two hundred million Units of Account (ECU).19
This de minimis rule is less generous than it might first appear. The
computation of "turnover" is not limited to the products or services included in the agreement, but rather is interpreted to include turnover in
all goods or services achieved by the contracting firms.20 Related entities
also are considered "participants" in calculating the combined annual
turnover.2'
Under article 85(2), an agreement violating article 85(1) is automatically void22 ab initio and without a prior decision by the Commission.2 3
This rule also has far reaching consequences in the area of private law,
because articles 85 and 86 are deemed to inure to the benefit of private

17. Cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Court interpreted
§ 1 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting agreements that are "unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions").
18. Cf 1 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L64) 1 (1970). There is, of course, no such de
minimis exception to the abuse of market power as proscribed by article 86.
19. Commission Notice of 3 September 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance
Which Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C231) 2 (1986), replacing Commission
Notice of 19 December 1977, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C313) 3 (1977). (The ECU is
defined as a basket of the member states' currencies, each of which is allotted a different
weight depending on the relative strength of the national currency.). See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3180178 of 18 December 1978, Changing the Value of the Unit of
Account Used by the European Monetary CorporationFund, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L379) 1 (1978), last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1971/89 of 19 June 1989, 32
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L189) 1 (1989). One ECU is currently worth about US $1.35.
20. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. at 3.'
21. Id. at 23.

22. Article 85(2) provides: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be null and void."
23. Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 1.
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individuals, and must be applied directly by the courts of the member
states.24 Agreements in violation of the general prohibition are2 5unenforceable as between the parties as well as against third parties.
Three considerations modify the seemingly harsh result of this "automatic nullity" provision. First, as will be discussed below, article 85(2)
does not apply when the agreement is exempted under article 85(3) from
the general prohibition. Second, the European Court of Justice (Court or
European Court) has made it clear that only those portions of an agreement that actually violate article 85(1) are to be considered automatically
void, 26 assuming, of course, that the void elements are severable from the
agreement. Finally, the European Court developed the "provisional validity" doctrine, whereby the so-called "old agreements" are shielded
from the application of article 85(2) by national courts unless the Commission has refused to issue an exemption pursuant to article 85(3).27

24. As early as 1963, the European Court of Justice enunciated the general principle
that individuals may rely on the prohibitions of Community law. Interpreting the purpose of the Treaty, the Court said that:
[it] is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between
the contracting states.
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law, for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
See N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 105, 129 (1963). While this holding conferred a right on individuals to challenge,
in national courts, customs imposed by member states in violation of article 12 of the
Treaty, the Court later stated that individuals also may benefit from the prohibitions of
the EEC competition rules. See Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, 1974 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, 62-63, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238, 271 (1974); see also ReweZentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskarnmer ffir das Saarland, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1989, 1997. The direct effect of the EC competition rules in the member states may
even enable private litigants to recover compensatory damages for the violation of articles
85 or 86 in national courts. For details, see Picafiol, Remedies in National Law for
Breach of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty: A Review, 1983 LEGAL ISSUES EUR.
INTEGRATION 1.

25. See Re 'Yoga' Fruit Juices, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 123, 134-38 (1969) (rejecting
the enforcement of an arbitration award for an alleged breach of an exclusive sales agreement that, itself, was void pursuant to article 85).
26. See Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH6, 1966 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 235, 250, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357, 376 (1966).
27. See Ets. A. De Bloos, s.p.r.l. v. Soci& en Commandite par Actions Bouyer, 1977
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Parties whose agreements fall outside the scope of the general prohibition of articles 85 and 86 may apply for a negative clearance from the
Commission certifying that "on the facts in its possession, there are no
grounds under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its
part in respect of an agreement, decision or practice."'28 Parties whose
agreements do not qualify for a negative clearance because they are in
violation of the general prohibition of article 85(1) may be eligible for an
individual or group exemption under article 85(3). Under the latter provision, the Commission will uphold agreements containing anticompetitive effects if they: (1) contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) allow
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits; (3) only impose restrictions that are indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and (4)
do not afford the participating parties the opportunity to eliminate competition with respect to a substantial part of the products in question.
Although commentators occasionally refer to these factors as the European "rules of reason,"2 the rationale of article 85(3) encompasses additional policy considerations, such as those intended to remedy overcapacity and other industry-wide problems. 30
In evaluating the propriety of granting exemptions under article
85(3), the Commission will subordinate the goal of fostering competition
when industrial and social policy goals are considered more important.3 1
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 511 (1978). Pursuant to article 5 of
Regulation 17, "old" agreements are those that were in existence at the date on which
Regulation 17 came into force, i.e., March 13, 1962. Id. at 2359, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 528. The rationale for shielding "old" agreements from automatic nullity under article 85(2) is to protect the legitimate expectations of parties who entered into agreements
which were valid when made. The same rationale applies to so-called "accession" agreements. According to article 25(1) of Regulation 17, these are "agreements, decisions and
concerted practices to which article 85 of the Treaty applies by virtue of accession [of
new member states]." Regulation No. 17, supra note 9.
28. Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 2.
29. See, e.g., U. TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW-BuSINESS ISSUES AND LEGAL
PRINCIPLES IN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES 56 (1982).

30. These considerations are not relevant to the rule of reason approach under § I of
the Sherman Act. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that the rule of reason
serves the limited purpose of evaluating the competitive significance of the challenged
conduct. Specifically, the Court noted that "[the purpose] is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of
an industry." Id. at 692.
31. Commission Decision of 4 July 1984 Relating to a ProceedingUnder Article 85
of the EEC Treaty (IV130.810-Synthetic Fibres), 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 207)
17 (1984), illustrates this approach: the Commission exempted a crisis cartel that had
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Thus, article 85(3) vests the Commission with broad powers to enforce
its own industrial policy."
Except for certain categories of agreements and practices specifically
defined in article 4(2) of Regulation 17," parties seeking an individual
exemption under article 85(3) must "notify" their agreement to the
Commission. Such notification confers immunity from fines imposed for
acts taking place "after notification to the Commission and before its
decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, provided they fall
within the limits of the activity described in the notification." 4

been formed by the 10 largest European manufacturers of synthetic fibre in an effort to
reduce structural overcapacities in the industry. Although the participating companies
held approximately 85% of the installed synthetic fibre capacity in the EC, the Commission concluded that the limited duration of the agreement (Oct. 1982-Dec. 1985), coupled
with the availability of alternative products supplied by outside competitors and the presence of equivalent goods, would mitigate the anticompetitive effects. Underlying this
analysis, however, was the Commission's focus on the diminution of surplus production
capacity as a means of resolving the persisting crisis in the industry.
32. This policy-setting power of the Commission is unlikely to be disturbed by judicial review. Applying what comes close to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review,
the European Court only infrequently has overturned the Commission's decision to grant
or deny exemptions. See, e.g., Etablissements Consten SARL v. Commission of the Eur.
Communities, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 347, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 477
(1966) (judicial review limited to evaluating the relative weight of the facts and resulting
conclusions); see also Remia BV. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1985 E.
Comm. Ct. J.R. 2545, 2578, 48 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 34 (1985). Third parties may
challenge the decision to grant an exemption on the basis of article 173(2) of the Treaty,
which vests natural and legal persons with standing when the contested decision is of
"direct and individual concern" to such parties. See Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH &
Co. KG v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 48 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 118, 155 (1987).
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, which was established in 1988 by Council Decision (88/591), 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L319) 1 (1988), encompasses competition cases appealed from the Commission. It is unclear at this time whether this Court
will curtail the broad discretion traditionally enjoyed by the Commission in this area.
However, one of the stated reasons for the establishment of this new court is to deal with
actions involving complex fact patterns. Id.; see also Kennedy, The EssentialMinimum:
The Establishmentof the Court of FirstInstance, 14 EUR. L. REv. 7, 25 (1989). Thus,
it is likely that the Commission's findings of fact, at least, will be subject to stricter
scrutiny than before.
33. For example, agreements that involve specialization in product manufacturing
need not be notified when the contract products do not represent more than 15% of the
volume of business done in identical or equivalent products and when the total turnover
of the participating parties does not exceed 200 million ECU. See Regulation No. 17,
supra note 9, art. 4(2)(3). While the parties are not required to notify such an agreement, they may want to do so, because only notification can shield them from the imposition of fines if they misjudge the status of their agreement.
34. Id. art. 15(5)(a). Prior to granting an exemption (or negative clearance), the
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In part to reduce the considerable backlog caused by the increasing
number of notifications and applications for individual exemptions and
negative clearances, the Commission created "group exemptions" that, in
principle, dispense with the notification requirement for certain categories of agreements. 30 As with individual exemptions, the Commission issues group regulations for a specific period." These exemptions contain
typical anticompetitive restrictions that may or may not be inserted in
the agreement ("white lists" and "black lists," respectively), thus en37
abling the parties to tailor their agreements accordingly.
The far-reaching impact of group exemptions on corporate behavior
should not be underestimated. These exemptions are formal decisions of
the Commission and, according to article 189(2) of the Treaty, apply
Commission must provide the parties with an opportunity to be heard under article 19(1)
of Regulation 17; in addition, the Commission must, before issuing any decision giving a
negative clearance or an individual exemption, publish a summary of the relevant application or notification in the Official Journal and invite all interested third parties to
submit their observations within a time period of no less than one month. Id. art. 19(3).
Pursuant to article 15(6) of Regulation 17, the Commission may withdraw immunity if
it finds, after preliminary examination of the notification, that the grant of an exemption
is not justified.
35. The Commission derives its authority to enact group exemptions from enabling
regulations of the Council of Ministers. See, e.g., Regulation No. 19165 of the Council
of 2 March 1965 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories
of Agreements and Concerted Practices,J.O. Eui. COMM. 533/65 (1965) [hereinafter
Council Regulation No. 19165]. So far, the Commission has adopted group exemptions
for the following categories of agreements: exclusive distribution agreements, Regulation
No. 26 1983183, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L173) 1 (1983); exclusive purchase agreements, Regulation No. 1984183, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L173) 5 (1983); patent
licensing agreements, Regulation No. 2349184, 27 O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. L219) 15
(1984); specialization agreements, Regulation No. 417185, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L53) 1 (1985); motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, Regulation No.
123185, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L15) 16 (1985); research and development agreements, Regulation No. 418185, 28 O.J. Etu. COMM. (No. L53) 5 (1985); franchising
agreements, Regulation No. 4087188, 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L359) 46 (1988); and
know-how licensing agreements, Regulation No. 556189, 32 O.J. EUa. COMM. (No.
L61) 1 (1989).
36. See Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 8(1); Council Regulation 19165,
supra note 35, art. 2(1).
37. The Commission's recent regulations regarding group exemptions include a socalled opposition procedure for "grey list" restrictions, which are neither expressly permitted nor expressly proscribed. While this procedure requires notification to the Commission, the time for processing has been reduced drastically: an agreement that has been
notified to the Commission will be deemed exempted unless the Commission, upon its
own initiative or upon the request of a member state, expresses its opposition within a
period of six months after such notification. See, e.g., article 7(1) and (5) of the group
exemption for research and development agreements, supra note 35.
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directly in the member states. Agreements that comply with the terms of
a group exemption are presumed to be in line with what article 85(3)
requires for individual exemptions. 8
Another device designed to bypass the lengthy proceedings for negative
clearances or individual exemptions is the administrative or "comfort"
letter. If an agreement notified to the Commission does not appear to
contain serious anticompetitive effects, the Commission may publish its
essential contents and invite comments from interested third parties.3" In
the absence of justifiable negative reactions, the Commission will close
the file by issuing a comfort letter.4" This letter conveys to the parties
involved that "[the] agreement is de minimis, falls under a block exemption regulation, [or] falls under one of the Commission's notices ... [and
therefore] poses no problem from the point of view of the competition
rules."

41

The Commission apparently differentiates between comfort letters and
its ordinary settlement practice. The Commission reserves the term "settlement" for "prospective" acts; that is, when the Commission attempts
to induce entities to structure agreements in accordance with favored policy goals. More than ninety percent of all formal proceedings before the
Commission 42 are terminated or suspended because of the parties' willingness either to abandon or amend their agreement in accordance with
legal requirements. 43 The Commission issues comfort letters, on the

38. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY Pt. 1, ch. 1, para. 1(iii) (1985) [hereinafter FIFTEENTH REPORT
ON COMPETITION].

39. The Commission publishes such agreements in the OfficialJournalof the European Community.
40. For details, see COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEvENTH REPORT
ON COMPETITION PoLICY pt. 1, ch. 1, § 4, para. 15 (1981); COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLcy pt. 2, ch. 1, § 10,

para. 72 (1983).
41. FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 38, pt. 1, ch. 1, para. 1(iii).
In 1988, 36 cases were closed by such comfort letters. Cf COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY,

(1988) [hereinafter EIGHTEENTH REPORT

pt. 2, ch. 2, para. 45

ON COMPETITION].

42. The impetus to initiate an investigation that may result in a formal proceeding
can originate from the Commission's own observations, from an application for negative
clearance or a notification for exemption as well as from the receipt of a formal or anonymous complaint. For details, see I. VAN BAEL &
THE EEC, 282-86 (1987).

J. BELLis,

COMPETITION LAW OF

43. Id. at 323-24. In 1988, the Commission settled 419 cases without formal decision. Two hundred of these required no action because of the enactment of the group
exemption on patent licenses. See EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note
41, pt. 2, ch. 2, para. 45.
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other hand, "retrospectively," in response to requests for exemptions or
applications for negative clearances in clear-cut cases."
If a formal proceeding results in a final decision holding that the parties' conduct constitutes an infringement of EC competition rules, the
Commission may issue a cease and desist order,"' or, if the offending
conduct has terminated. already, the Commission may declare simply that
the parties' conduct amounted to an infringement of the competition
rules.4 The Commission may impose fines for violations of articles 85
and 86, and further may require affirmative remedial steps, such as
forcing a defendant to supply materials it previously refused to provide."'

44. See generally Van Bael, The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission, 23 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 61 (1986).
45. Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
46. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 20 December 1977 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (iV129.151-Video Cassette Recorders), 21 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (L47) 47 (1978).
47. Upon finding an infringement of article 85(1) or article 86, the Commission may
assess a fine pursuant to article 15 of Regulation 17, or require periodic penalty payments in accordance with article 16 of Regulation 17. Under article 15, the Commission
may assess two types of fines. First, article 15(1) allows for fines ranging from 100 to
5000 ECU to be imposed on parties that supply incorrect or misleading information
regarding an application for negative clearance or notification for an exemption. The
same sanction may be imposed for obstructing the Commission's fact-finding efforts. Second, under article 15(2), negligent or intentional infringements of the substantive competition rules may entail significantly higher fines. These fines may fall between 1000 and
1,000,000 ECU, "or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover of the
preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement."
The European Court has interpreted "turnover" to include the sales of all products on a
worldwide basis. See SA Musique Diffusion Franqaise v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1825, 1908, 38 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 221, 336
(1983). Pursuant to article 15(2)(b), the amount of a fine depends on the gravity and
duration of the infringement. In determining the gravity of the infringement, a variety of
factors must be considered, such as the value of the goods involved in the infringement,
the profit derived by the parties from the infringement, the threat of the particular infringement to the objectives of the Community, and the knowledge of the parties. Id. at
1911, 38 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 338.
48. See, e.g., Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 256, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309, 345 (1974);
see also Commission Decision of 14 December 1985 Relating to a Proceeding Under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.698-ECSIAKZO), 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
374) 1, 27 (1985), in which the Commission, in addition to assessing a 10 million ECU
fine, imposed the obligation on AKZO to inform its customers about the non-binding
character of certain requirement contracts. Also, the Commission ordered AKZO to submit an annual report demonstrating compliance with the cease and desist order contained
in the Commission's decision. Id.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EC COMPETITION LAW AND
NATIONAL RULES

A.

Infringements of EC Law Alone

Although the-German GWB contains provisions similar to those of the
EC competition rules," the latter require that the agreement or practice
affect trade between the member states, while the GWB is designed to
protect competition within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, the infringement of articles 85(1) or 86 does not always
entail a violation of the GWB, because the proscribed agreement may
not have a sufficient effect on competition inside Germany. In addition,
certain practices of entire industries are exempted from the prohibitions
spelled out in the German competition rules. For example, agreements
of loan associations and insurance companies, as well as agreements and
practices of public utilities, may qualify for exemption under sections
102 and 103 of the GWB, 50 even though these agreements would fall
squarely within the scope of article 85(1).
It is well settled that conflicts created by practices which are permitted
under German law, but prohibited under EC law, must be resolved in
favor of the EC rules. The European Court of Justice consistently has
upheld the general principle that Community law takes precedence over
conflicting national laws.5 1 In Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, a leading
49. Similar to articles 85(1) and (2), for example, § 1 of the GWB reads in pertinent
part: "Agreements made for a common purpose by enterprises or associations of enterprises and decisions of associations of enterprises shall be of no effect, insofar as they are
likely to influence, by restraining competition, production or market conditions with respect to trade in goods or commercial services." Translation taken from F. BEIER, G.
SCHRICKER

& W. FIKENTSCHER, GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
205 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter F. BEIER].

COPYRIGHT AND

ANTITRUST LAWS

50. The recent amendments to the GWB have limited the scope of possible exemptions under these provisions to some extent. For a discussion of the revised § 102 concerning insurance under the GWB, see Ratliff, Tupper & Curschmann, Competition
Law and Insurance: Recent Developments in the European Community, 18 INT'L BuS.
LAW. 352, 356-57 (1990); see also Pfeffer, supra note 3.
51. See, e.g., Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
425 (1964). In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 263 (1978), the Court held that
[t]he relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the [Community] institutions on the one hand and the national law of the
member-States on the other is such that those provisions and measures not only by
their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of
current national law but-in so far as they are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the memberStates-also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the
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decision on the primacy of EC competition law, the Court stated that
[t]he binding force of the Treaty and of measures taken in application of it
must not differ from one state to another as a result of internal measures,
lest the functioning of the Community system should be impeded and the
achievement of the aims of the Treaty placed in peril. Consequently, conflicts between the rules of the Community and national rules in the matter
of the law on cartels must be resolved by applying the principle that Com52
munity law takes precedence.
While this decision involved practices prohibited under both Community and German law, the Court recently confirmed the supremacy of
the prohibitory EC competition rules over permissive internal laws. In
Verband der Sachversichererv. Commission,5 the Court upheld a decision of the Commission refusing to grant a negative clearance and an
exemption pursuant to article 85(3) in favor of a German association of
insurance companies. 4 The association had issued certain recommendations to its members in violation of article 85(1), claiming that the general prohibition of Community law did not apply. The association argued that section 102 of the GWB controlled, a provision that establishes
the legality of agreements subject to the supervision of the German Federal Supervisory Office for the Insurance Industry. Indeed, the German
Federal Cartel office already had authorized the recommendations at issue. In support of its position, the insurance association argued that the
market for insurance contracts follows idiosyncratic rules, which are
matters of national economic policy alone. The association contended
that so long as the Council had not adopted special rules regulating the
insurance market pursuant to article 87(2)(c), the general prohibition of
article 85(1) had only limited application to the insurance industry. 55
The European Court of Justice disagreed. Turning the association's
argument on its head, the Court held that articles 85 and 86 apply,
without qualification, to all branches of the economy, including the insurance industry, unless an economic activity specifically has been exempted from the scope of the articles by the Treaty or regulations
adopted thereunder. 6 In addition, the Court noted that in the absence of
extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions.
Id. at 643, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283.
52. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 14, 3 Comm. Mkt.

L.R. 100, 119 (1969).
53.
54.
55.
56.

4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. Antitrust Supp. 264 (1988).
28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L35) 20 (1985).
Id. at 23.
Specifically, the Court stated that
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such a general exemption, only the Commission itself, and not the German authorities, could grant or deny individual exemptions pursuant to
article 85(3). In essence, then, prohibitions under the EC competition
rules preempt conflicting national law, provided, of course, that the practice in question passes the jurisdictional threshold of articles 85(1) and
86 as capable of affecting interstate trade.
B. Infringements of Both EC Law and the German Competition
Rules
The second arena for possible conflict between the EC and German
competition rules 'arises when a violation of the Community rules on
competition simultaneously constitutes an infringement of German law.
Since key provisions of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition are similar to the equivalent Community rules, 57 this is not an unlikely scenario. The European Court of Justice addressed the main issues associated with these double transgressions in Wilhelm. 58 The case
involved fines imposed by the German Federal Cartel Office
(Bundeskartellamt) on several German dye manufacturers that had conspired among themselves, as well as with producers from other EC
member states and third countries, to raise the price of aniline (a chemical dye base) by eight percent in violation of section 1 of the GWB. The
German manufacturers appealed this decision. Prior to the
Bundeskartellamt decision to assess fines, the Commission, on its own
initiative, had instituted proceedings against the German manufacturers
and other producers of aniline that were parties to the agreement. Thus,
the questions arose whether the same facts may give rise to independent
proceedings under national law when the Commission has already asserted its jurisdiction, and whether double sanctions may ensue as a
result. 59

[ilt must also be observed that Regulation 17 lays down detailed rules for the
implementation of Articles 85 and 86 EEC for all the branches of the economy to
which the provisions apply with the sole exception of those branches covered by
special rules laid down on the basis of Article 87 EEC, as is the case with certain
sectors of the transport industry such as sea and air transport. No exception of
that type, however, exists in the case of the insurance industry.
Verband der Sachversicherer,4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. Antitrust Supp. at 295.
57. See supra note 49.
58. See Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 100 (1969).
59. Id. at 3, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 101.
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1. Dual Proceedings
The German court in charge of hearing the appeal, the Regional Appellate Court of Berlin (KammergerichtBerlin), referred these and related questions for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to article 177 of the
Treaty of Rome, to the European Court of Justice. On the issue of dual
proceedings, the Court held that national authorities, such as the German Bundeskartellamt, may apply national law in independent proceedings against improper practices concurrent with a Commission examination of the same practices under Community law. The Court reasoned
that, unlike articles 85 and 86, national rules were not drafted to protect
trade among member states, but instead were enacted to preserve competition from a national point of view. ° The Court held that as long as the
relationship between national laws and the EC competition rules has not
been defined officially pursuant to article 87(2)(e),"1 national authorities
are free, in principle, to pursue those who violate national competition
rules.
The Court in Wilhelm nevertheless made it clear that this principle
will be disregarded when the application of national law would prejudice
the full and uniform application of Community law.6 2 Although the
Court failed to elaborate on how to avoid a conflict that may arise in
parallel proceedings, 3 its holding did imply that national antitrust authorities uncertain as to the compatibility of their future decisions with
those of the Commission either should stay their proceedings and await a
decision by the Commission or consult with the Commission before
adopting a national decision. 4
65
While parallel proceedings such as those in Wilhelm are still rare,

60.
61.

Id. at 13, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 118.
.
Id. at 13-14, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 118; see also supra note 4 for text of article

87(2)(e).
62. The Court stated that "this parallel application of the national system can only
be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the
Common Market of the Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures
adopted in implemention of these rules." Id. at 14, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
63. The Court noted that:
Where, during national proceedings, it appears possible that the decision to be
taken by the Commission at the culmination of a procedure still in progress concerning the same agreement may conflict with the effects of the decision of the
national authorities, it is for the latter to take the appropriate measures.
Id. at 14-15, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
64. See FouRTH REPORT ON COMPETmON, supra note 9, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 7, para.

46.
65.

Wilhelm, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100.
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they do occur-and they are not always handled in accordance with the
above guidelines. For example, the Kammergericht Berlin stated, in dictum, that proceedings before the Commission are irrelevant as long as it
has not handed down its decision."6 Similarly, the KammergerichtBerlin
held that a case pending before the Commission did not require the German Federal Cartel Office to stay its proceedings involving the same
67
matter because both legal systems seek to protect different interests.
Both assumptions are in obvious disregard of the rules announced by the
Court of Justice.
2.

Double Sanctions

The Wilhelm case also posed the related but different question of
whether parallel proceedings may result in the imposition of concurrent
sanctions, one assessed by the Commission and the other by the German
antitrust authority.6" Using a rationale similar to that employed in the
United States criminal justice system to support the imposition of consecutive sentences by state and federal courts, 9 the European Court of Justice noted that the prohibition against double jeopardy did not apply,
because such penalties emerge from different and sovereign legal systems.7 0 However, based on equitable considerations, the Court rejected a
strict application of this principle,7 1 holding that a prior penalty must be

66.

Gebilhrenfestsetzung fir

schaften, 28

Meldung von Vertrfigen von Verwertungsgesel-

WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB [WuW] 65,

66 (1978).

67. See UntersagungvertraglicherAusschliesslichkeitsbindungenim KraftfahrzeugErsatzteilgesch)ft, 30 WuW 615, 626 (1980). Emphasizing the different objectives that
are assigned to the Community rules and national antitrust law, German courts tend to
deny any possibility of conflict between the two legal orders.
68. Aside from cease and desist orders, the German antitrust authority may impose
fines, pursuant to § 38(4) of the GWB, which may amount to DM 1 million, or a sum
in excess thereof, but not exceeding three times the amount of the surplus (Mehrerlas)
that had been gained as a result of the unlawful conduct. Section 37(b) of the GWB
provides for an alternative fine as punishment for a specific kind of illegal conduct: the
antitrust authority may claim surplus that was intentionally or negligently obtained
through abusive price increases after such abuse has been enjoined through a final cease
and desist order pursuant to § 22(5) or § 103(6). The surplus, however, may be claimed
only to the extent other fines or damages assessed against the violation do not reach that
amount. See also supra note 47.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
70. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 15, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 100, 111 (1969).
71. Specifically, the Court held that "[i]f... the possibility of two procedures being
conducted separately were to lead to the imposition of consecutive sanctions, a general
requirement of natural justice ... demands that any previous punitive decision must be
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factored in when assessing consecutive sanctions.
The German Federal Supreme Court followed this approach in the
national proceedings in Wilhelm. For reasons of fairness, it struck down
the fines imposed on the dye manufacturers by the German antitrust
authority, because the Commission already had punished the manufacturers. 72 Thus, depending on the sequence of the decisions in parallel
proceedings, either the Commission or a German court will have to take
into account any previous penalty imposed for the same offense.7 3
It is doubtful whether this principle of offsetting sanctions enunciated
by the European Court of Justice in Wilhelm applies in cases involving a
second proceeding outside Community's jurisdiction. In Boehringer
Mannheim GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, the
Court refused to reduce a one hundred eighty thousand ECU fine under
Community law, even though the defendant already had been assessed
an eighty thousand dollar fine in United States antitrust proceedings. 4
The Court held that the prohibition on double sanctions announced in
Wilhelm applies only in cases involving identical acts. While the fines
imposed by the Commission in Boeringerwere based on agreements prohibited under United States law, the Court noted that the ruling in the
United States proceedings could have been based on other conduct not
examined by the Commission."' The Court also stated that it is for the
defendant-applicant to prove the identity of acts to avoid or reduce an
additional sanction. Since Boehringer had not met this burden, the Court
did not reach the additional issue raised by the Commission, which was
whether additional sanctions need not be taken into account when they

taken into account in determining any sanction which is to be imposed." Id. at 8; Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 111.
72. Decision of the Supreme Court, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 521
(1971).
73. "Double punishment" nevertheless remains a problem in parallel proceedings.
For example, legal expenses, including attorney's fees of the prevailing party, ordinarily
will be borne by the unsuccessful party both under national law (§§ 77 et. seq. GWB)
and under the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice (art. 69(2)), which
are also applicable to proceedings before the Court of First Instance. THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1962).
74. 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1281, 1289-90, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 864, 886-88
(1973).
75. Since the conviction in the United States was the result of a plea of nolo contendere, it remained unclear which facts actually would have been material for a conviction. The court nevertheless did say that "[a]lthough the actions on which the two convictions in question are based arise out of the same set of agreements they nevertheless
differ essentially as regards both their object and their geographical emphasis." Id. at
1289, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 887.
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are imposed in non-EC member states.
While the question regarding sanctions imposed outside the EC has
not been decided yet, some commentators suggest that the imposition of a
fine outside the EC at least may be taken as prima facie evidence that
the offense is distinct rather than identical, and therefore need not be
taken into account for purposes of computing the fine to be assessed
under Community law.7 6 The Commission, however, recently has placed
less emphasis on the "identical act" requirement than one might expect
from the foregoing. In its Cast Iron & Steel Rolls decision,7 the Commission took account of fines imposed by the German Bundeskartellamt,
although these fines were based on offenses not identical (albeit closely
related) to those acts giving rise to the proceedings under Community
law. This decision may have been influenced, however, by the poor financial situation of the parties in the case. Indeed, the Commission cited
the "grave" economic condition of the parties and "their needs in their
task of recovery" as an additional mitigating factor in assessing fines.7 8
C.

Permissive Community Law Versus Prohibitive National Rules

The third area of potential conflict between EC and German national
antitrust law arises in cases in which conduct not prohibited by EC rules
nevertheless is prohibited under German law. Considerable doubt exists
whether EC law controls such cases. According to the traditional twobarrier theory, which was long espoused by German authors79 and still
is adhered to widely by German courts, corporate behavior must be permissible under both systems. As a result of this cumulative application, it
is always the more stringent legal regime that prevails over the more
lenient. Thus, prohibitory national law is vested with absolute priority
over permissive Community law. The two-barrier theory is rooted in the
notion that the scope of the two legal systems cannot overlap since they
protect different spheres: national law is concerned with the effects of
corporate behavior on the internal market, while the Community rules
are intended to protect trade between member states. In essence, the twobarrier theory denies the very possibility of a conflict between national

76. A. GLEISs & M.

HIRSCH, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-KARTELLRECHT,

annot. 75

(3d ed. 1978).
77.

26 o.J. EUR.

COMM.

78. Id. at 15.
79. See B. GOLDMAN,

(No. L317) 1 (1983).

EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAw 426 (1973); Koch, Das
Verh~dtnis der Kartellvorschrifen des EWG-Vertrags zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 14 DFR BETRiBs-BERATER 241 (1959); Baruch, Das Verhaltnis zwischen der Kartellregelungdes EWG-Vertrages und des GWB, 13 WuW 14, 20 (1963).
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and EC law.
In Wilhelm, the European Court of Justice recognized the fundamentally different objectives of both systems and the consequent possibility
that they could be applied in parallel proceedings.80 The Court qualified
this position, however, noting that "economic phenomena and legal situations ...may in individual cases be interdependent [and] the distinction
between community and national aspects could not serve in all cases as
[a] decisive criterion for the delimitation of jurisdiction. ' " Moreover, the
Court held that the simultaneous application of national and EC rules
will not be tolerated when it would prejudice the full and uniform application of EC competition law, a holding that clearly recognizes the po82
tential for conflict.

While this position is incompatible with the two-barrier theory, it was
enunciated in a case involving the cumulative enforcement of prohibitions under both systems. The Court, however, has not yet had to rule
on the applicability of the two-barrier theory to restrictive practices that
benefit from an exemption under article 85(3), but face prohibition
under national rules.
The balance of this article will examine whether and to what extent
prohibitory national law must give way to the Commission's decision to
exempt agreements from the enforcement of article 85(1). Before examining the possible solutions to this conflict, however, Community exemptions first will be distinguished from other devices upon which the Commission relies in its decision to tolerate a particular business activity or
agreement.
1. The Status of Comfort Letters and Negative Clearances
As previously discussed, exemptions under article 85(3) are relevant
only for restrictive agreements that violate the general prohibition of article 85(1). Article 85(3) merely declares the prohibition inapplicable to
certain agreements or types of agreements. As for agreements that are
not covered by the prohibitions of articles 85(1) or 86, the Commission
issues comfort letters or negative clearances. It has been argued, therefore, that comfort letters issued by the Commission should not preclude
national authorities from applying national competition law that may be
stricter than the EC rules.8"
80. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
81. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 13, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 100, 118 (1969).
82, See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
83. See I. VAN BAEL & J. BELLIs, supra note 42, at 319.
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Case law confirms this view-at least with respect to comfort letters
which indicate that the agreement does not violate article 85(1).84 For
example, the so-called "Perfume Cases" 5 involved various selective distribution networks that authorized only a limited number of retailers to
sell certain brands of perfumes. Criminal proceedings in the French Tribunal de Grande Instance (French Tribunal) were brought against the
managing directors of several perfume companies that, in violation of
French law, refused to sell their products to dealers who were not parties
to the exclusive distributorship agreements. The defendants relied,
among other defenses, on comfort letters issued by the Commission."6
The Court of Justice, called upon by the French Tribunal to give a
preliminary ruling on the status of these comfort letters, decided that the
letters did not take precedence over national law, which prohibited the
agreements in question. The Court stressed the independent application
of national laws when the agreement or practice does not reach the jurisdictional threshold of article 85(1), which requires that the agreement
affect trade between member states.8 7 These same considerations apply
to informal settlements and suspensions-compromises reached between
the Commission and the parties as a result of the latter's willingness to
modify illegal agreements so as to take them outside the scope of articles

84. This result does not necessarily follow, however, if the comfort letter indicated
that the agreement falls under a group exemption regulation. In that case, the result will
hinge upon a determination as to whether a group exemption prevails over conflicting
national competition rules. For a discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying
notes 120-24.
85. Procureurde la R~publique v. Giry and GuerlianS.A., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2327, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 99 (1981).
86. The Commission stated in these letters that:
[I]n view of the small share in the market in perfumery, beauty products and
toiletries held by your company in each of the countries of the Common Market
...there is no longer any need, on the basis of the facts known to it, for it to take
action in respect of the above-mentioned agreements under the provisions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. The file on this case may therefore be closed.
Id. at 2340-41.
87. The Court held that:
The fact that a practice has been held by the Commission not to fall within the
ambit of the prohibition contained [in] article 85(1) and (2), the scope of which is
limited to agreements capable of affecting trade between Member States, in no
way prevents that practice from being considered by the national authorities from
the point of view of the restrictive effects which it may produce nationally.
Id. at 2375, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 136. However, comfort letters are not without any
legal value. The Court suggested that national courts examining the compatibility of
practices or agreements with article 85 take into account the opinion transmitted in such
letters. Id. at 2374, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 135.
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85(1) and 86.88
Negative clearances granted pursuant to article 2 of Regulation 17
involve slightly different considerations in that they constitute formal decisions of the Commission. Nevertheless, because negative clearances are
like comfort letters in that they involve a declaration that the activity
does not violate Community rules,8 9 they also imply that no conflict exists between EC and national law and that the latter may be applied.
2.

Individual and Group Exemptions

a. The View of the Commission
The status of agreements that are prohibited under national law and
also would be forbidden by the EC rules but for group or individual
exemptions granted under article 85(3) is much less clear. This is an
important problem because the Commission recently has granted several
new group exemptions covering broad areas of economic activity, thereby
increasing the potential for serious conflicts with national law.
While the relationship between such permissive EC law and prohibitory national competition rules has been discussed widely, it is by no
means certain whether the principle established by the Court in Wilhelm, that EC law must prevail over conflicting national law, applies
likewise in this case. Again, the decision in Wilhelm provides the starting
point for the analysis. The Court, after delineating the system of
prohibitions and exemptions established by article 85, held that
while the Treaty's primary object is to eliminate by this means the obstacles to the free movement of goods within the common market and to confirm and safeguard the unity of that market, it also permits the Community authorities to carry out certain positive, though indirect, action with a
view to promoting a harmonious development of economic activities within
the whole Community in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. 9°
The strong majority opinion argues that this sentence refers to Com-

88. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
90. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 14, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 100, 119 (1969). Article 2 reads:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 2.
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munity exemptions,"' which require that the agreement or practice display certain positive characteristics beneficial to consumers, and that the
Court intended that such individual exemptions granted under EC law
would prevail over prohibitive national law. It is not immediately clear,
however, whether all exemptions, group exemptions included, foreclose
the application of prohibitive national competition law. According to the
Wilhelm Court, national law is inapplicable only when it would impede
the uniform application of Community rules,92 and it is uncertain
whether and to what extent the application of national law to an exemption under the EC rules would constitute such an impediment.
The Commission has interpreted the Wilhelm decision as favoring the
principle of primacy of Community exemptions.9" The Commission,
however, has not delineated the precise parameters of this principle, but
has indicated that national prohibitions must yield to permissive Community law when the application of the former would affect the sub94
stance (Kernbestand) of an exemption.
The practical consequences of this formula are not immediately evident, as the GKNISachs merger decision illustrates. 5 In that case,
GKN, a British holding company, controlled a group of approximately
two hundred firms primarily involved in mechanical engineering of automotive component parts, structural steel engineering, and the manufacture and distribution of iron and steel products. Sachs, a German holding company, controlled, ten firms, the most important of which
produced, among other things, car component parts. The Commission
found that as far as the market for components was concerned, the proposed merger would not amount to an abuse of a dominant position in

91. See, e.g., D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL & J. JAMES, BEC ANTI-TRUST LAW, 142
(1975); but see Markert, Some Legal and Administrative Problems of the Co-Existence
of Community and National Competition Law in the EEC, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
92, 97 (1974), stating that this formula makes reference to other measures under the
Treaty, such as directives under article 102 to member states to harmonize national laws.
Given the context in which the Court spoke about positive, though indirect measures, i.e.,
the dynamics of competition policy under article 85, it is difficult to agree with this
position.
92. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
93. See FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 9, pt. 1, ch. 1, sec. 7, para.
45; see also EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 41, at 15 (The Commission equates group exemptions with "positive although indirect action.").
94. See BUNTE & SAUTER, EG-GRuPPENFREISTELLUNGSVERORDNUNGEN, 193
(1988), quoting a Working Paper of the Commission of Oct. 10, 1984 (IV/003/R/101).
95. See SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 9, pt. 1, ch. 4, § 7, paras.
181-82.
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violation of article 86.96 Following an analysis of the merger's effect on
the steel market, the Commission authorized the merger based on article
66(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty). 7 Under the GWB, the ECSC Treaty preempts the
application of German competition law.98 Nevertheless, the German
Federal Cartel Office prohibited the merger pursuant to section 24 of the
GWB on the ground that it would strengthen the dominant position of
Sachs in the German market for certain component parts."9 Thus, the
two proceedings led to diametrically opposing outcomes.
Despite the apparent contradiction, the Commission explicitly endorsed the German ruling, stating that it would not create a conflict with
Community law.'00 This conclusion appears unassailable with respect to
the market for component parts. Thus, a conflict exists only if both legal
systems apply to an offense. Since the Commission already had found
that the agreement regarding component parts did not implicate article
86, no conflict was created by the application of prohibitive national law
to the agreement. 101
However, given the preemptive effect the GWB accords the ECSC
Treaty, it is difficult to deny that a conflict exists between the Commission's authorization of the merger pursuant to article 66 of the ECSC
Treaty and the German prohibition. The Commission reconciled its position with the principle of primacy of Community law by indicating
that the authorization based on article 66 pertained to only a minor aspect of the merger, its effect on the steel market. Since the merger primarily would have affected the market for component parts, and since
this main effect did not fall under the prohibition of article 86, the Cartel Office was free to prohibit the merger under internal law.'0 2

96. Id.
97. Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty provides, among other things, for the authorization of transactions that will not enable the parties to evade the rules of competition
instituted under the ECSC Treaty by "establishing an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage in access to supplies or markets." Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
98. Section 103(3) of the GWB provides: "This Act shall not apply:... 3. insofar as
the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 18 April 1951 contains special provisions."
99. The German Federal Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Cartel Office.
Untersagungeines Markterweiterungszusammenschlusses,28 WuW 375, 376 (1978).
100. SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra, note 9, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 1, paras. 11013.
101. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the status of
negative clearances and comfort letters.
102. Mergers with a community-wide impact no longer will be susceptible to such
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In summary, both the European Court of Justice and the EC Commission recognize the potential for conflict between Community exemptions and prohibitory national laws. This recognition implies a rejection
of the traditional two-barrier theory. Although many details remain uncertain, the Commission takes the view that exemptions enjoy, in principle, priority over conflicting national rules. When permissive Community law concerns only negligible facets of the agreement or practice, as
in Sachs, a national interest in prohibiting the anticompetitive conduct
based on local law may prevail.
b.

The Approach of German Courts to Community Exemptions

Most German courts do not appear to acknowledge the supremacy of
Community competition law. Instead, several decisions imply that an exempted agreement or practice may stand only if it also is in accord with
the German competition rules. For instance, the Decision of the German
Federal Supreme Court of July 1, 1976103 illustrates the reluctance to
resolve such priority conflicts according to the principles espoused in
Wilhelm.
In that case, the defendant (a BMW dealer) and the plaintiff car
manufacturer (BMW) had entered into a standard agreement that, as
part of a selective distribution system operated by BMW in Germany,
imposed certain restrictive obligations on the defendant, including a partial prohibition on dealing in competing products. Without the consent of
BMW, the defendant nevertheless reached an agreement with Peugeot to
sell Peugeot's vehicles as well. As a consequence, BMW terminated the
contract with the defendant and appointed a competitor of the defendant
as the area's exclusive BMW dealer. That competitor, without BMW's
objection, had been a dealer for both BMW and Peugeot until Peugeot
terminated the previous agreement and entered into the new one with
the defendant that gave rise to the suit. BMW sought to enjoin the defendant from holding itself out as a BMW dealership.
The lower courts held for the plaintiff, and the Federal Supreme
parallel application of Community law and national competition law. According to the
recently adopted Merger Control Regulation, it would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to consider the propriety of such mergers. However, the criterion
of "Community dimension" defined in article 1(2) of the Regulation is not met easily,
and it is doubtful whether the GKN/Sachs merger would have reached the turnover
thresholds delineated in this article. See generally supra notes 7-8 and accompanying
text.
103.
(1976).

Verweigerung einer Zweitvertretung gegenfiber Vertragshindler,27 WuW 335
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Court reversed and remanded the case. The Court found that the termination of the distribution agreement may have constituted an unjustifiedly unequal treatment of the defendant vis-a-vis the competitor,'"'
thus violating section 26(2) of the GWB. 10 5
Prior to the Federal Supreme Court's judgment, the Commission had
applied article 85(3) to the standard form contract between BMW and
its dealers, thereby exempting such agreements from the general prohibition contained in article 85(1).11" After balancing the anticompetitive effects of the selective distribution system with the benefits, the Commission concluded that the latter clearly outweighed the former. The
Commission found that the clause prohibiting dealers from dealing in
competing products without the consent of BMW would strengthen the
overall competition between BMW and other car manufacturers.",
The exemption granted by the Commission was the result of a detailed examination of the distribution system, and certainly qualified as a
"positive though indirect action" taking precedence over conflicting national law as envisioned by the European Court in Wilhelm.'08 The
German Federal Supreme Court nevertheless maintained that the Commission's decision could not prevent application of section 26(2) of the
GWB. According to the Court, the Commission's decision only rendered
inapplicable the prohibitions of article 85(1), which in turn could not
preempt section 26(2) of the GWB.' 09 Although the court accurately restated the relation between articles 85(1) and 85(3), it begged the ques104. The court did not issue a final decision, holding that it was necessary for the
lower court to review additional evidence. Id. at 338.
105. Section 26(2) GWB provides in pertinent part:
Market dominating enterprises, associations of enterprises ... shall not unfairly
hinder, directly or indirectly, another enterprise in business activities which are
usually open to similar enterprises, nor in the absence of facts justifying such differentiation treat such enterprise directly or indirectly in a manner different from
the treatment accorded to similar enterprises. Sentence 1 shall also apply to enterprises and associations of enterprises, insofar as small and medium-sized suppliers
or purchasers of a certain type of goods or commercial services depend on them to
such an extent that sufficient and reasonable possibilities of dealing with other
enterprises do not exist.

106. Decision of the Commission of December 13, 1974, 18 J.0. BUR. COMM. (No.
L29) 1 (1975).
107. Id. at 7.
108. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. While the exemption primarily concerned agreements that took effect on the German market, the widespread tying of
BMW dealers had Community-wide ramifications and could have affected trade between
member states.

109.
(1976).

Verweigerung einer Zweitvertretung gegeniiber Vertragshandler,27 WuW 335
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tion presented by the Commission's decision. This decision called for an
independent assessment of the status and effects of a Community exemption pursuant to article 85(3) in relation to prohibitions under GWB
section 26(2), rather than the interaction between the prohibitions contained in articles 85(1) and 26(2) of the GWB.
The Court's refusal to attribute any independent importance to Community exemptions demonstrates its adherence to the traditional twobarrier theory,11 an approach shared by other German courts."" Indeed, in only rare instances have German courts indicated that they
would be prepared to recognize the priority of Community competition
law. A recent judgment of the Regional Court of Frankfurt (Landgericht Frankfurt) is one such instance."'
That case involved the question whether a car manufacturer may impose on its contract dealers the obligation not to supply vehicles to car
leasing businesses outside the distribution system. The obligation violated
section 26(1) of the GWB, which prohibits indirect refusals to sell.11
Notwithstanding this prohibition, the court examined whether the exclusion of these companies would be legal under a group exemption granted
by the Commission for selective distribution agreements for motor vehicles. This exemption allows the imposition of an obligation on the dealer
"to supply to a reseller contract goods or corresponding goods only where
the reseller is an undertaking within the distribution system."114 Although the court eventually found that the group exemption did not ap-

110. The lower court to which the case was remanded nevertheless ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, albeit on grounds unrelated to the priority question. Gerechtfertigte Vertragskfindigung wegen Ubernahme einer Zweitvertretung, 27 WuW 718 (1977). This
decision received final confirmation by the Federal Supreme Court, again, without mention of the Community exemption. Gerechtfertigte Vertragskfindigung wegen
Ubernahme einer Zweitvertretung, 29 WuW 776 (1979).
111. See, e.g., Decision of the Kammergericht (Appellate Court) Berlin of December
1, 1976 (Kart. 51/76) 27 WuW 265, 266 (1977), in which the Court held (in dictum)
that, as a general rule, Community law and national law coexist separately and apart
from each other, and that national law may even enjoy priority if a conflict arises between the two legal orders. See also supra notes 66-67 for the decisions of the same
court.
112. EG-Freistellungvon Kfz-Vertragshindler-Bindungengilt nicht fr Leasinggesellschaften, 39 WuW 942 (1989).
113. Section 26(1) of the GWB provides: "Enterpises or associations of enterprises
shall not incite another enterprise or association of enterprises to refuse to sell or
purchase with intent unfairly to harm certain enterprises." Unofficial Translation from
F. BEIER, supra note 49, at 221.
114. Regulationt No. 123185, supra note 35, art. 3(10)(a).
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.ply to the facts before it," 5 its willingness to consider the Commission's
actions indicates an awareness that Community law might take priority
over conflicting German law. In most cases, however, German courts
have tended to ignore or to misjudge the conflicts between permissive
Community law and prohibitions under national law, thus confirming
their adherence to the two-barrier theory.
c.

The Views of Commentators

While there are considerable differences of opinion regarding the extent to which permissive Community law should prevail over contrary
national competition rules, most authors appear to both acknowledge the
potential for conflict and endorse a solution that is based on the primacy
principle as enunciated in Wilhelm. The differences of opinion on the
exact status of Community exemptions are triggered by the Wilhelm
Court's rather vague formula whereby the Commission may "carry out
certain positive, though indirect, action with a view to promoting a harmonious development of economic activities within the whole community
116
in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty."
The narrowest academic interpretations of this formula state that an
exemption can take precedence over conflicting national law only in exceptional cases. Proponents of this position are concerned about the
"grave interference [of permissive Community law] with [the] exercise of
the sovereign powers of the member states to deal with restrictive business practices that have adverse effects on their territory."11 As a consequence, it is suggested that only when the Commission explicitly
designates an exemption as a measure in support of economic policy can
there exist a priority of permissive Community law over prohibitive national law." 8 While this view has the virtues of certainty and ease of
application, it is too narrow in scope. Before granting an exemption
under article 85(3), the Commission must evaluate whether an agreement contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods, or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a

115. The Court decided that the meaning of "resellers" in article 3(10)(a) of Regulation 123/85 does not encompass leasing companies, which do not transfer ownership to
the ultimate consumer. EG-Freistellungvon Kfz-Vertragshandler-Bindungengilt nicht
fir Leasinggesellschaften, 39 WuW 942, 943 (1989).
116. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
117. Markert, The Dyestuff Case: A Contribution to the Relationship Between the
Antitrust Laws of the EuropeanEconomic Community and its Member States, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 869, 889 (1969).
118. Id.
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fair share of the resulting benefits. Thus, an exemption, by definition, is
a decision "in support of economic policy." 11' 9 Not surprisingly, decisions
to exempt an agreement never have been accompanied by statements indicating policy reasons in addition to those inherent in article 85(3).
Other authors take the view that individual, but not group, exemptions take precedence over prohibitory national law. 2 ' These commentators argue that group exemptions primarily are based on considerations
of convenience and efficiency, but are not intended to promote economic
integration, and thus are not the sort of action that the Wilhelm Court
envisioned when discussing the primacy of "indirect, albeit positive" actions by the Commission over national law.
While it is true that the Commission has authorized group exemptions
in an effort to alleviate its ever-increasing work load, 21 this view fails to
recognize that the enactment of group exemptions also is contingent
upon a specific finding that the category of agreement meets the criteria
set forth in article 85(3).122 Moreover, group exemptions are binding
regulations that, pursuant to article 189(2) of the Treaty, directly apply
119. A. Gixiss & M. HIRscH, supra note 76, annot. 62.
120. See, e.g., MAILANDER, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR EWG-GRUNDZfIGE
annot. 21 (3d ed. 1972).
121. Those who argue that group exemptions do not take priority over national law
note that the Commission need not examine individual cases to determine whether an
agreement qualifies. It also should be noted, however, that "grey list" restrictions constitute an important exception in that they are subject to the opposition procedure upon
notification of the agreement. See supra note 37. The Commission's decision not to act
against a notified agreement within six months is very similar to the affirmative decision
granting an individual exemption pursuant to article 85(3). The former also calls for an
individual evaluation of the agreement at issue. Arguably, then, agreements that were
exempted as a result of an opposition procedure reflect a positive, though indirect action
of the Commission for stronger reasons than do "white list" agreements that clearly fall
within the ambit of a group exemption. Because of their greater potential for affecting
trade, "grey list" agreements are neither expressly permitted nor expressly proscribed
under a group exemption regulation. The Commission's tolerance of such an agreement
evidences that, on balance, the benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement in accordance with article 85(3). See also Bunte, Das Verhialtnisvon deutschem zu
europdischem Kartellrecht, 39 WuW 7, 18 (1989).
122. Article 85(3) expressly refers to "category of agreements,". "category of decisions," and "category of concerted practices." The Commission, elaborating on the status
of group exemptions confirms this view:
When agreements fulfil the conditions for block exemption, this means that they
are presumed to be in line with the conditions which Article 85(3) imposes for
individual exemptions. In fact, the advantage of such regulations is that they provide enterprises with legal certainty without requiring them to notify their agreements to the Commission.
See FIFrEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 38, pt. 1, ch. 1, para. 1(iii).
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in all member states. Because group exemptions are apt to influence the
corporate behavior of a great number of parties throughout the Community,' 23 they are more important in fostering integrated economic development in the Community than are individual exemptions. 24 Therefore,
it makes little sense to argue that individual exemptions take precedence
over national law, while group exemptions do not.
A third group of authors recognizes that all exemptions, whether
based on individual decisions or group regulations, generally must be
deemed positive, though indirect actions of the Commission, and conclude that no agreement covered by an exemption can be prohibited by
national law.1 25 This conclusion, though inviting, is not compelling
under the principle that Wilhelm enunciated. While the Wilhelm Court
authorized the Commission to carry out certain "positive acts," it did not
preempt the application of national law altogether, but only when it
would "prejudice the uniform application throughout the Common Market of the Community rules on cartels and of the full effects of the measures adopted in implementation of those rules."' 26 Application of national prohibitive law, however, does not in every case imperil "the
uniform application" of Community rules.
d. The Scope of Exemptions as a Gauge for the Primacy of
Community Law
The "uniform application" standard enunciated by the Wilhelm Court
suggests that the extent to which permissive Community law takes precedence can be ascertained only by examining the actual scope of the exemption. A closer look at the group exemption for patent license agreements' 17 illustrates the point. The list of exempted agreements contained
in article 2 of that regulation is not limited to restrictive agreements that

123. The substantial number of settlements without a formal decision are due in
large part to the parties' willingness to modify their agreements to conform with a group
exemption. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
124. The substantial economic impact also is reflected both in the prerequisites for
enacting a group exemption and the mandatory monitoring process during its limited
duration, As to the former, for example, the conditions under which the Commission
exercises its powers to enact regulations must be the result of a "close and constant

liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States." See the preamble to the
enabling Council Regulation No. 19/65, supra note 35, which vests the Commission
with the power to enact group exemptions. As to the latter, the Commission may revoke
or amend a regulation taking account of changed economic circumstances. Id. art. 2(2).
125. See, e.g., A. GLEISS & M. HmSCH, supra note 76, annot. 61-67.
126. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
127. See Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 35.
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violate article 85(1); for the sake of legal certainty, the Commission also
exempted agreements that normally do not fall within the ambit of article 85(1). Like negative clearances,12 8 the prohibition of these latter
types of agreements under national law cannot create a conflict with
Community law, because article 85(1) does not apply. Thus, while the
group regulation on patent license agreements amounts, as a whole, to a
"positive, though indirect action" that should not be subject to national
prohibitive law, not every agreement exempted thereunder enjoys that
status.
Furthermore, abusive practices committed under the guise of an exemption also may be prohibited under national law. While it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to grant and to revoke individual exemptions under article 85(3),129 national courts are entitled to
gauge a particular practice in light of an existing exemption and to apply national law against that practice when it clearly is out of line with
what the Commission intended to exempt from the prohibition of article
85(1).1s3 The application of national laws, then, certainly is not apt to
impair the uniform application of Community law or the measures taken
or to be taken to implement it.'
Irrespective of the substantive scope of an exemption, there cannot be
a conflict with national laws when the agreement is outside the time
limits prescribed by the exemption. Thus, corporate behavior that falls
outside the temporal scope of the exemption also is susceptible to national sanctions. It stands to reason that an agreement-which has not
been duly notified under Regulation 17 to the Commission may subject
the parties to fines under national laws,' 3 2 even though it either clearly
would have qualified for an individual exemption or actually was later
exempted from the prohibition contained in article 85(1). A decision
ordinarily cannot take effect earlier than the
pursuant to article 85(3)
33
notification.
of
date

128.
129.
130.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, arts. 9(1), 8(3).
Bunte, supra note 121; see also Steindorf, Europziisches Kartellrecht und

Staatenpraxis, 142

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDEISRECHT

UND WIRT-

scHAmFsREcHT 525, 548 (1978).

131. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
132. Note that a national court also could declare the agreement null and void under
Community law, should the agreement violate the general prohibition of article 85(1).
See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the direct effects and applicability of Community law in the member states.
133. See Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 6(1) ("Whenever the Commission
takes a decision pursuant to article 85(3) of the Treaty, it shall specify therein the date
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It is less clear, however, whether the period after notification, but
before the Commission's decision to grant or deny an exemption under
article 85(3), should merit similar treatment. An affirmative answer
would enable courts and antitrust authorities of the member states to
impose sanctions under internal laws against agreements that are immune from Community fines. 1 8 The application of national law against
an agreement while Commission action is pending could thwart the retroactive effect of any exemption that may ultimately be granted, as exemptions usually relate back to the date of notification.1"8 The question
thus becomes whether a national court must suspend its proceedings and
await a decision by the Commission to avoid such possible conflicts with
Community law.
At first glance, this solution appears appropriate in light of the Wilhelm decision. The Court in Wilhelm hinted at the duty of national
courts to suspend proceedings if a conflict concerning the same agreement were to arise. 3 This case, however, involved parallel formal proceedings, one instituted by the German Federal Cartel Office, the other
by the Commission. The Court intimated that suspension might be appropriate when, "during national proceedings, it appears possible that
the decision to be taken by the Commission at the culmination of a procedure still in progress . . . may conflict with the . . . decision of the
national authorities. 1 37 The mere notification of an agreement, however,
is not tantamount to initiating a "procedure" as required under Wilhelm.138 The Commission may not act upon a notification for years, and
there is no imminent possibility of conflict of the sort envisioned by the
Court in Wilhelm. Requiring national courts to suspend their proceedings upon notification not only would exceed what is required under
Wilhelm, but also would ignore a major aim of the Court in rendering
the decision: to vindicate the genuinely independent status of national
law. If national courts were required to suspend their proceedings upon
notification of an agreement, the application of national law could be

from which the decision shall take effect. Such date shall not be earlier than the date of
notification.").
134. Id. art. 15(5)(a). For details, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
135. Cf Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 6.
136. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969,E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 14-15, 8 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 100, 119 (1969).
137. Id., 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
138. See SA Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77,
88, in which the Court stated, albeit in a different context, that the Commission's acknowledgment of receipt of a notification for obtaining an exemption under article 85(3)
cannot be considered an official act, initiating a procedure.
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eliminated virtually at the whim of the parties to the agreement.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate for national courts to suspend proceedings because of a notification to the Commission only when the
Commission expresses its intent to issue an exemption."3 9 This expression of intent occurs when the Commission publishes a summary of the
relevant notification and invites all interested parties to submit their ob140
servations within a certain time limit.
Of course, should the Commission eventually issue an exemption that
is incompatible with a decision of the national authorities rendered prior
thereto, the latter may have the duty to solve the conflict by vacating the
decision and reopening the case."" However, such corrective action
should have only prospective effect. For example, fines would not have to
be repaid to undertakings if these fines were assessed by the national
antitrust authority for violations of national laws occurring before the
Commission's action. At the time, no conflict existed; nor can it be said
that there was any positive, though indirect, action on the part of the
Commission with respect to the activity for which the national authority
had assessed a penalty during the period prior to the Commission's official action.
National law also, in certain cases, may impose shorter time periods
on the duration of restrictive agreements than provided for in an exemption granted by the Commission. This priority of stricter national law is
illustrated in Regulation 1984/83, a group exemption for various categories of exclusive purchasing agreements." 2 While Regulation 1984/83
provides that one type of exclusive purchasing obligation, requiring gas
station operators to purchase their petroleum products from a single supplier, may have a maximum duration of ten years,' 143 the Commission
has made it clear that it intends to set merely an upper limit. The Commission noted that laws in the member states proscribing a shorter dura44
tion "are not contrary to the objectives of this Regulation.'
Given that the Commission stated explicitly that Regulation 1984/83
did not preempt national laws on the duration of agreements, one may

139.
140.

See Markert, supra note 91, at 98.
Regulation No. 17, supra note 9, art. 19(3).

141.

See

FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION,

supra note 9, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 7, para.

46, in which the Commission states: "The legal obligation for national authorities to
respect the primacy of Community law also applies, however, where an earlier decision
of the national authorities subsequently turns out to be incompatible with Articles 85 or
86."
142. Regulation No. 1984183, supra note 35.
143. Id. art. 12(1)(c).
144. See id. recital (No. 19).
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argue that other limitations in exemptions that are unaccompanied by
such qualifying language imply, argumentum e contrario, that national
laws indeed are preempted in this respect. This argument may have
merit with respect to ceilings on the duration of other types of exclusive
purchasing agreements that are addressed in Regulation 1984/83.
Outside the area of time limitations on agreements, there is little guidance about whether regulation (short of prohibition) by national authorities is permissible with respect to agreements for which an exemption
already has been granted. Here, the above argument is less persuasive in
that, for example, an exempted agreement must satisfy the formal requirements imposed by national law.14 It follows that no priority conflicts exist when the actual operation of an exempted agreement is contingent upon the compliance with certain national requirements, such as
the mandate that certain mergers and acquisitions be notified to the state
antitrust authority.1 46 On the other hand, the imposition of such requirements must not affect the exemption so as to render it entirely inoperative in light of its intended scope.
This rule in particular illustrates that national courts will not always
be in a position to judge with certainty whether and to what extent national laws or regulations may be applied without rendering the exemption entirely inoperative. Such doubts about the compatibility of internal
law with the ultimate objective of creating equal conditions for competition throughout the Common Market can be resolved by referring the
matter to the European Court of Justice, which then will determine the
true scope of the exemption in a preliminary ruling pursuant to article

145. The Commission explicitly has recognized and acknowledged this regulatory
function of national law. In a recital (No. 29) to Regulation 123/85, the group exemption regarding selective distribution agreements for motor vehicles, the Commission noted
that "[The exemption] is without prejudice to laws and administrative measures of the
Member States by which the latter, having regard to particular circumstances, prohibit
or declare unenforceable particular restrictive obligations contained in an agreement exempted under this Regulation; the foregoing cannot, however, affect the primacy of Community law." Regulation 123/85, supra.note 35, at 19, para. 29.
146. See A. GLEISS & M. HIRSCH, supra note 76, annot. 63; see also Markert,
supra note 91, at 96. On notification requirements for mergers and acquisitions, see §§
23 and 24a of the GWB; the pertinent provisions of these lengthy and complex regulations are reprinted in F. BEIER, supra note 49, at 213 et. seq. Mergers that fall under
the newly adopted Merger Control Regulation 4064/89, supra note 7, need not be notified to the national authorities; the Commission's jurisdiction over such mergers is exclusive. Article 21(2) of the Regulation provides: "No Member State shall apply its national
legislation on competition to any concentration that has a Community dimension." Regulation, supra note 7, art. 21(2).
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177 of the Treaty. 14 7 Of course, a referral presupposes that national
courts are willing to acknowledge that internal competition rules are capable of conflicting with Community law. Thus, to the extent German
courts continue to adhere to the traditional two-barrier theory, such referrals to the European Court of Justice are unlikely.
III.

CONCLUSION

The primacy of EC competition law is a universally acknowledged
principle. Few dispute its actual operation when Community law prohibits a particular corporate practice. This is the case, regardless of
whether German law permits or prohibits the same practice. In the former instance, German law must give way unqualifiedly. In the latter,
the application of German law is appropriate only in as much as it does
not frustrate the uniform application of the Community rules. Thus, national authorities must avoid parallel proceedings that result in conflicting outcomes or in additional fines for the same corporate practice.
The operation of the primacy principle is less clear in cases involving
the application of Community exemptions to practices that violate German competition law. The two-barrier theory, traditionally advanced to
justify the absolute priority of national prohibitions, is based upon the
fallacious premise that conflicts between the systems cannot arise. As the
discussion in this Article shows, both individual and group exemptions
under Community law do create the potential for conflict with national
law, a conflict that must be resolved in accordance with the general principle of Community law primacy.
Nevertheless, this broad principle is not as sweeping as it appears,
because close analysis of the true scope of Community exemptions often
shows that they do not cover the implementation of a particular agreement. When this is the case, application of national law will not work
against the Community law's objectives. Even when an agreement falls
within the scope of an exemption, the national rules may operate to prohibit or restrict its operation upon a showing that the Community has no
real interest in barring national authorities from applying their own law.
Thus, the recognition that permissive Community .competition law
should, in principle, take precedence over prohibitive national law, does
not dispose of the need for analyzing on a case-by-case basis the effect
that application of national prohibitions may have on the public policy
goals embodied in the Community exemptions.

147. Cf. Steindorf, supra note 130, at 549. The jurisdiction of the newly created
Court of First Instance does not encompass such preliminary rulings.

